We present examples of existing evidence that lead us to be cautious about claims made in the original paper that the proposed model provides a better fit to experimental data than do existing models. We raise concerns about the accuracy of this and other assertions and about the adequacy of the comparisons made with alternative models in the existing literature.
Introduction
"presents a new model of probabilistic binary choice under risk" that, according to the author, outperforms existing probabilistic models. The main improvement of the model, in relation to existing models, is that it satisfies both stochastic dominance and weak stochastic transitivity which, according to Blavatskyy (2011) , are desirable properties of any descriptive choice model, since they are rarely violated in the data. Blavatskyy claims that the model can explain "behavioral regularities" such as the common ratio effect or preference reversal. The purpose of the present paper is to examine whether this strong claim can really be justified. In this comment we note that by its very construction the model cannot explain the well-established common consequence effect. Moreover, its ability to explain the common ration effect is limited: cases which the model does not explain have been frequently observed. Finally, the Abstract claims that the model, "provides a better fit to experimental data than do existing models". However, Blavatskyy (2011) takes just two datasets and compares the proposed model with a small and selective subset of competing models. This illustrates that the model has some power, but it hardly amounts to robust support for the rather sweeping claim made in the Abstract. The purpose of the present paper is to draw attention to a body of evidence which predates the 2011 model and which exhibits systematic response patterns that the model does not accommodate.
An Outline of the Model and Some Implications
The model, which takes standard expected utility (EU) as its core theory, can be summarised as follows: (i). For any pair of lotteries X and Y it is possible to identify a Greatest Lower Bound (GLB) which is defined as the best lottery that is dominated by both X and Y. 1 1 It is also possible to identify a Least Upper Bound (LUB) which is the worst lottery that dominates both X and Y. The analysis in Blavatskyy (2011) can equally well be conducted in terms of GLB or LUB but we shall focus on the analysis in terms of GLB.
(ii). For each lottery in the pair, the key measure is the difference between the EU of that lottery and the EU of the GLB. Denote these differences by X' and Y' respectively.
(iii). The probability that X is chosen rather than Y in a binary choice between the two is expressed as a function of {X', Y'}. More specifically, the probability that X is chosen rather than Y is given as:
(iv). It follows from (1) that when φ(X') = φ(Y') -that is, when EU(X) = EU(Y) -the probability of choosing each option is 0.5. This is quite independent of the nature of φ(.) and allows us to reconfigure the Marschak-Machina triangle (Machina, 1982) , replacing the deterministic indifference curves of standard EU by '50-50 lines' -lines where the probability of choosing any one of the lotteries on the line rather than any other lottery on the same line is 0.5.
In Figure 1 below, the probability of the highest payoff x 3 is depicted on the vertical axis and the probability of the lowest payoff x 1 is shown on the horizontal axis.
Hence the certainty of the intermediate payoff x 2 is shown by C at the lower left corner of the triangle. Suppose the individual's preferences are such that his EU for this sure payoff is the same as his EU for a lottery offering a 0.8 chance of x 3 and a 0.2 chance of x 1 -this lottery represented by C^ in Figure 1 . Then the line connecting C to C^ represents the set of lotteries from which we can draw any pair such that the probability of choosing each lottery in that pair is 0.5.
(v). All other solid lines parallel to the line connecting C with C^ also identify sets of lotteries which have a 0.5 probability of being chosen when paired with any other lottery on that same line: for example, any pair of lotteries on the line connecting F to F^ are equally likely to be chosen in a binary choice between them; so too any pair of lotteries on the line connecting J to J^. Figure 1 (vi). For other pairs of lotteries not on the same solid line, the probabilities of being chosen will vary. For example, consider lotteries C and E in Figure 1 . E is stochastically dominated by C^ so that EU(E) < EU(C^) and therefore EU(E) < EU(C), with the result that Prob(C  E) > 0.5. This is signified diagrammatically by the fact that the dashed line between C and E slopes up from left to right but has a gradient less than that of the solid line connecting C to C^. So in the Blavatskyy model, we have curves that are composed by all lotteries that have the same probability of being chosen over one common lottery. In Figure 1 we have a curve composed of all lotteries that have the same probability as E of being chosen over C, and another 
curve composed of all lotteries than have the same probability as D of being chosen over C. The curvature of these curves depend on the specification of φ(.). For example, if φ(x) = e x -1, as Blavatskyy assumes for the purposes of econometric fitting, probability curves are concave below the 50% probability line and convex above this line.
(vii). So the probability of one lottery on the dashed line between C and E being chosen over another lottery on that same dashed line is liable to vary, depending on the specification of φ(.). For example, a specification like φ(x) = e x -1 will entail that
5 since the probability curve that joins C and E will be further from the 50-50 line than the probability curve that joins C and D. Thus the probability of a more south-westerly lottery being chosen over a more north-easterly lottery on a given dashed line will tend to fall as the distance between them becomes smaller. 
Implications for the Common Ratio Effect
If we take a specification of φ(.) which entails Prob(C  E) > Prob(C  D) as in (vii) above and combine it with the property that Prob(C  D) = Prob(J  K) as in (viii) above, we get Prob(C  E) > Prob(J  K). This latter pattern has been frequently observed in experiments yielding what Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Chew and Waller (1986) ; a number of the triangles presented to Group 1 in Loomes and Sugden (1998) ; the last of the four cases 2 in Table 2 in Bateman et al (2006) and all three cases in Table 6 and six out of twelve cases in Tables 10 and 11 of that paper.
There is a further implication of the model in relation to CRE which has not been much examined experimentally but for which some evidence exists. In most experimental examinations of the CRE, C is chosen over E by a substantial majority of respondents. But suppose the parameters are set such that E is more likely to be chosen i.e. Prob(E  C) > 0.5. If the specification of φ(.) is such as to produce the 'usual' CRE, the implication will be that Prob(E  C) > Prob(K  J) > 0.5: that is to say, Prob(K  J) will be closer to 0.5 than Prob(E  C). The reason is that all functions that produce the 'usual' CRE in the Blavatskyy model have the opposite curvature on the other side of the 50-50 probability line and so here too probabilities get closer to 50-50 when the distance between the lotteries is reduced.
However, in their Experiment 1, Bateman et al (2006) found three pairs where a clear majority favoured the counterpart of E over the counterpart of C and where that majority became even larger in the case of the counterpart of K compared with the counterpart of J -in two of these cases to a highly significant extent 3 . Such patterns are contrary to the model when φ(.) is specified in the way required to produce a 'standard' CRE pattern.
Implications for the Common Consequence Effect and Corollaries
Given Axiom 4, the model cannot explain the classic form of Allais paradox (which
Kahneman and Tversky called the Common Consequence Effect (CCE)). This is noted
by Blavatskyy (2011, p.5) , who states that is directly contrary to that Axiom. In terms of Figure 1 , the classic CCE takes the form of a comparison between {C, D} and {J, K} where, typically, C is chosen over D rather more often than J is chosen over K. But
Axiom 4 requires the probabilities to be the same for both pairs.
On this issue, there is some 'special pleading': Blavatskyy claims that although many studies have found evidence of the CCE, these violations are reduced or disappear when lotteries are located inside the probability triangle or when the choices involve a gradient of 1. However, there is no mention in the formulation of the model that it applies only to a subset of cases. On the contrary, as already seen, the Abstract claims that "the proposed model provides a better fit to experimental data than do existing models"; but since the great majority of experiments to date have tended to use stimuli where at least one of the lotteries lies on an edge of the triangle, it is strange to introduce the caveat on p5. Moreover, the great majority of CRE cases involve pairs where both lotteries lie on the edge. Part of the claim made for the model is that it accommodates such data, so welcoming 'edge' data when they fit with the model but setting them aside when they conflict with the model seems somewhat anomalous.
As noted in ( Table 2 ) considered two triangles with very different gradients, with each triangle containing a set of three pairs that were all half of the {C, E} distance apart and a set of eight pairs that were all a quarter of the {C, E} distance apart. These data very clearly reject the implications of Axiom 4.
Comparisons and Clarifications
Given the body of evidence which directly challenges a basic axiom and certain central implications of the proposed model, how does it turn out, as stated on p5, that "Econometric estimation shows that the new model compares favourably with existing models. Its predicted choice patterns often lie significantly closer to actual revealed choices."?
In part, the answer may be the particularity of the two datasets to which the models are fitted. But perhaps a larger part of the explanation lies in the choice of 'opponent' models: as any boxing manager knows, one's own fighter can often build up an impressive record of wins if you match him/her only against a carefully selected subset of opponents.
There are two ways in which other models in the literature differ from the model proposed by Blavatskyy (2011) . Any probabilistic model might be thought of as a combination of a 'core' theory with a stochastic specification, so different models might vary either in terms of the particular core or in terms of the stochastic specification -or both. The model in Blavatskyy (2011) has an EU core, modified to allow the main arguments to be differences between the EUs of each lottery and the EU of the GLB for that pair. This is then embedded in a stochastic specification of the same general form as the Luce (1959) choice model.
However, given the limitations of the model as far as the CRE and CCE data are concerned, an alternative possibility would be to use a core which is better suited to such data: namely, some form of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) model.
Alternatives of this kind exist in the literature -see, for example, Buschena and Zilberman (2000) , a paper which is listed in Table 1 of Blavatskyy (2011) Turning now from the issue of the choice of core model to the issue of the stochastic specification, there is a rather different way of proceeding -the 'random preference' (RP) approach (Becker, DeGroot and Marschak, 1963) -which is mentioned but dismissed without (we suggest) adequate consideration. On p1 it is stated that "The main drawback of the random preference model is that it leads to violations of weak stochastic transitivity that are rarely observed in the data . . ."; and on p5, "Unlike the random preference/utility model, the proposed model does not generate intransitive choice cycles . . .". Both of these assertions may give false impressions.
First, it is an error to say that the proposed model does not generate choice cycles.
Any model of probabilistic choice -including this one -which allows some possibility of either alternative in a binary choice being chosen and which also allows these possibilities to be independent between different binary choices is liable to generate at least some -and conceivably, quite a few -choice cycles. Second, it is not true that an RP specification necessarily results in violations of WST: whether it may or may not do so depends on the specification of the core distribution of preferences and upon the nature of the lotteries being presented 4 .
However, by ruling out all RP specifications, Blavatskyy (2011) eliminates a competing model which has had at least some success in the past. Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden (2002) took an EU core and an RDEU core and embedded each in a simple Fechner specification and also in an RP specification and applied these models to the dataset from Loomes and Sugden (1998) . Although Loomes et al. (2002) were guarded about extrapolating too much from a single study, the indication was that, for the dataset in question, an RP formulation of a simple form of RDEU performed well, although there were signs that respondents' experience might move their behaviour in the direction of an RP formulation with an EU core.
They also acknowledged that the low rate of violations of dominance may have favoured RP over the simple Fechner specification, in which case the Blavatskyy (2011) model, being better suited to this low rate, should provide stiffer competition against both of the RP specifications in Loomes et al (2002) . Unfortunately, by ruling RP out on a priori grounds, the original paper leaves this question unanswered. In the absence of any comparison with existing RP formulations with some established credentials, it seems premature to claim so confidently that the proposed model "provides a better fit to experimental data than do existing models".
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that there is a considerable body of evidence that the model proposed in Blavatskyy (2011) cannot explain. Such direct evidence may be a more telling basis for evaluating the model than an econometric fitting exercise which is based on just two datasets and which involves comparisons with just a few alternative models, with other potential competitors omitted from consideration.
We share with Blavatskyy (2011) the need to develop probabilistic models that respect first-order stochastic dominance. However, we suggest that such models should aspire to account for the full range of well-attested empirical regularities. The success of such an enterprise requires us to be alert to the limitations as well as the strengths of new models and to evaluate competing models on the basis of an open competition with all potentially viable alternative candidates.
